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Abstract 
Theoretically, contracts are inevitably incomplete. Incomplete contract (IC) is characterized by 
the absence of clearly defined, in its entirety, ex-ante the parties’ requirements, rights and 
obligations and there are gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities in its terms. On the one 
hand, IC exposes the contracting parties to the risk of opportunistic behavior, haggling, and 
disputes, but on the other hand, it allows flexibility to deal with uncertainty and change. Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts in Malaysia also cannot avoid being incomplete and there are 
twelve (12) clauses that contribute to the incompleteness. Literature review and two-round 
modified Delphi method were carried out to assess IC’s implication in Malaysian PFI 
concession contracts. This paper aims to report on the said assessment. The findings showed 
that the presence of IC in PFI projects in Malaysia causes positive and/or negative implications. 
Most of the positive implications mentioned on the flexibility of the incomplete clause to deal 
with future changes and provide the parties opportunity to renegotiate. Meanwhile, many 
negative implications refer to delay, disputes, and the risk of opportunistic behavior. Input from 
this paper will facilitate contract designers, and those involved in PFI projects in emphasizing 
or giving attention to the aspect that contributes to contracting incompleteness and its 
implications and consequently improves the provisions when drafting new contracts. 
 




The concept of incomplete contract (IC) concerns the substance of a contract. In principle, 
a contract must state the parties’ responsibilities and the required actions in dealing with all 
anticipated incidents (Onishi et al., 2002). The contracting parties need to identify and address 
all uncertain situations which might occur in the agreements, where the potential future 
contingencies might be too numerous and/or too difficult to anticipate (Domingues & 
Sarmento, 2016). Hence, failing to identify future uncertainties and contingencies make a 
contract incomplete. Theoretically, a complete contract cannot be achieved and most contracts 
are inevitably incomplete (Domingues & Sarmento, 2016; Nur Syaimasyaza et al., 2017a). 
When there is IC, there is potential for inefficiency (Garvin, 2009) and dispute (Grant et al., 
2012). 
 
In Malaysia, the government is actively procuring infrastructure projects via Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI). However, past studies revealed that PFI contracts in Malaysia are 
incomplete, and the areas and clauses that contribute to the incompleteness has been identified 
(Nur Syaimasyaza et al., 2017a; Nur Syaimasyaza et al., 2017b). Hence, it is important to 
assess the implication of IC for the improvement of future PFI contracts. 
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This paper reports part of a four-years research programme regarding incomplete contract 
in PFI, which focus on the assessment of IC’s implication based on PFI concession contracts 
in Malaysia through a two-rounds Modified Delphi with PFI experts. The remaining parts of 
the paper are structured as follow: a review of the literature on IC, PFI, and IC in PFI, 
descriptions of the methodology used, presentation of the results and the ensuing discussions. 




Incomplete Contract (IC) 
 
IC is defined as a contract that fails to clearly spell out ex-ante the parties’ requirements, 
duties and obligations for every realized contingency and it has gaps, missing provisions, and 
ambiguities in its terms (Hart, 1995; Yates, 1998). A complete contract is just an imaginary 
concept used by people to define one endpoint of completeness (Craswell, 1999) as it is almost 
impossible to achieve complete contract (Grant et al., 2012; Habets, 2010) because parties 
always face with uncertainties which consequently requires them to renegotiate, breach or 
litigate. 
 
A contract can be incomplete due to long-duration project (Iossa et al., 2007), high risk 
and uncertainty (Ya-zhuo & Fan, 2011), high transaction cost (Hart, 1995), bounded 
rationality (Kostritsky, 2004), and asymmetric information (Robinson & Scott, 2009). Table 
1 presents the characteristics of IC. If a contract has in its provisions any one or more of the 
listed characteristics, then the contract is deemed incomplete. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of IC  
No. Characteristic Keyword 
1. The contract has gap or loophole GAP 
2. Contract has vague or ambiguous clauses AMBIGUOUS 
3. There are additional work and changes CHANGE 
4. The contract is renegotiated NEGOTIATE 
 (Nur Syaimasyaza, 2017; Nur Syaimasyaza, Mohd Fairullazi, et al., 2017a) 
 
Although the contract is incomplete, the contracting parties still can complete the 
transaction. However, under the existence of IC, the project’s success may be affected either 
positively or negatively. Positive implication means that the presence of IC may help 
smoothen the progress of the project (Guasch, 2004) while negative implication refers to any 
implication that might disrupt the progress of the project or compromise the success of the 




IC is flexible in dealing with complex and uncertain future (Boukendour, 2007; Miller et 
al., 2013). For long duration contract, such as toll road concession contract, flexible IC is 
preferred as the uncertainty of traffic flow is high (Athias & Saussier, 2010). IC allows the 
contracting parties to renegotiate when the need arises, to provide supplement terms to fill the 
missing terms or provided a solution to the contingency that they cannot forecast before 
(PPIAF, 2009). In some situation, a complete contract might jeopardize the ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. The perfect example is in the case of chef Jamie Oliver criticizing 
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the quality of school dinner in Britain. As the schools are locked in 25 years PFI contracts, 
they cannot rid their menus of junk food as it is stated in the contract (Ellman, 2006). Besides 
that, the transaction cost for IC is claimed to be lower than complete contract (Miller et al., 
2013) as the contracting parties sometimes leave out certain contingency when it is deemed 
not significant (Ya-zhuo & Fan, 2011), or the probability of the contingency to occur is very 
low (Triantis, 1999). Consequently, the process of drafting the contract can speed up by 




IC exposes the contracting parties to the risk of opportunistic behavior, haggling, and 
disputes (Domingues & Sarmento, 2016; Ho & Tsui, 2009). Renegotiation conducted due to 
IC could also affect the project negatively as its execution will impose several costs (Bajari 
et al., 2014; Domingues & Sarmento, 2016; Guasch, 2004; Hart, 1995) i.e. extra cost, 
manpower, time. Conflicts and disputes happen when there are ambiguities in the contract, 
variations, and additional works. When variation and additional works are needed in the 
contract, it could cause time and cost overruns (Peter et al., 2010). Therefore, it could imply 
that by having IC, the project might experience time and cost overruns. 
 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
 
PFI is an alternative procurement strategy that had been introduced to undertake some of 
the development of public infrastructures and services on behalf of the public sector. In PFI, 
the public sector will specify the required output and purchase the services provided by the 
private sector. On the other hand, the private sector will be responsible to finance, design, 
construct, manage, operate and maintain the project until the end of the concession period. 
Normally, the contract period expands to 20-30 years. United Kingdom (UK) becomes the 
pioneer in PFI when they introduced the procurement strategy in 1992. Malaysia started to 
implement PFI in 2006 and later it becomes a subset of Public-Private Partnership (PPP). PFI 
involves complicated contract structures as it involves a contract with various entities. The 
main contract i.e. concession contract is formed between government (public sector) and the 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). While SPV formed contracts with other entities to commence 
the project i.e. finance provider (i.e. debt provider, construction investor, facilities 
management investor and other investors), construction contractor and facilities management 
operator. 
 
Some countries such as the UK, Northern Ireland, and Japan, have designed their own 
standard PFI contract. While in Malaysia, there is a standard template for PFI contract which 
is drafted by Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia, but it is private and confidential. 
However, the standard contract can also become incomplete. Especially for standard PFI 
contract which has long contract duration, the provisions stated in the contract can easily 
become obsolete after some time. The prolonged contract duration exposes the PFI project to 
many risks and uncertainties. The risks include changes in social, economic, political and 
technological (Froud, 2003). Among past studies that contended that PFI contracts are 
inevitably incomplete are Guasch (2004), Iossa et al. (2007) and Ho & Tsui (2009). 
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IC in PFI 
 
Seven (7) areas in PFI contract that are deemed incomplete from past studies were 
identified and they are: 1) concession charges; 2) service delivery; 3) design of output 
specification; 4) variation; 5) quality; 6) contract monitoring; and 7) sustainable element (Nur 
Syaimasyaza, 2017). These areas were used to identify the presence of IC in PFI projects, and 
the method is named as PFI Area Rule. The clause is categorized as incomplete if it matches 
with any one or more area that has been identified by past studies. Besides that, IC 
Characteristic Rule was used to identify the presence of IC, where the clause is categorized 
as incomplete if any one or more clause/sub-clause of the contracts show signs of IC 
characteristics (refer Table 1). By using the above methods, an analysis of eight Malaysian 
PFI concession contracts was carried out and the results found 12 clauses that are deemed 
incomplete (in a typical PFI contract). The clauses are as follow: 1) Condition precedent; 2) 
Concession charges; 3) Design and construction of the project; 4) Delay of the construction 
works; 5) Asset management services; 6) Service levels; 7) Additional works; 8) The 
concession company; 9) Force majeure; 10) Project monitoring committee; 11) Dispute 
resolution committee; and 12) Occupational safety and health requirements (Nur 
Syaimasyaza, 2017). 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
Intensive literature review and two rounds of modified Delphi (MD) were carried out to 
achieve the research objective. Literature review involved a review of past research to identify 
implications of IC, with specific reference to the twelve incomplete clauses identified. Data 
collected from literature review were then become input for the development of semi-
structured questionnaires for MD. 
 
Table 2. Administration of the MD technique 
 Description 
Panelist criteria • Knowledge wise - possess at least a Degree in the area related to the practice 
of PFI for construction works, e.g. architect, quantity surveyor, engineer, 
banker, etc.  
• Skills - ability to make a sound judgment based on:  
1) knowledge and experience in PFI implementation and contracts 
through involvement in PFI projects e.g. in the form of policy, planning, 
implementation, supervision etc.; or  
2) the evidence of expertise such as past studies, publications, and 
positions.  
• Having worked experience in PFI projects in Malaysia. 
Sample size • Expert was identified from literature searches, pilot study, and web-search. 
• Snowball technique. 
• 23 experts were identified and invited to be the panelists.  
• 18 participated in Round 1 (78.2% rate of response), 13 participated in Round 
2 (72.2% rate of response). 
 
In the current study, two (2) rounds of MD involving 18 and 13 Malaysian PFI experts 
respectively were conducted (Table 2). MD is a variation of the Delphi technique. Delphi is 
a widely used method in achieving a consensus of experts' opinions concerning real-world 
knowledge on a specific area of studies. The techniques may be carried out in several styles 
(see discussions on MD in Mohd Fairullazi & Khairuddin (2016); Mohd Fairullazi (2014); 
Nur Syaimasyaza (2017); Nur Syaimasyaza et al. (2017a)). 
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For the first round MD questionnaire, the panelists were required to rate their level of 
agreement with the implications stated, on a 5-point Likert-type scale (i.e. 1. Strongly 
disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neutral/Not sure, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree) and they were also 
asked to give suggestions of other implication of IC with specific reference to each clause 
identified. 
 
In the second round, the panelists were provided with descriptive statistic results obtained 
in the first round i.e. their mode score and descriptive statistic of the group response (mode 
and standard deviation (SD)). The mode score was calculated to determine the value that has 
the greatest frequency in the data set and SD score was calculated to measure the variability 
of response in the data set and the level of consensus achieved. In this round, the panelists 
were given the opportunity to re-rate their proposed scores in the first round and they were 
encouraged to provide the reason(s) if they decided to do so. Apart from that, the additional 
suggestions and comments received in the first round were consolidated and presented in a 5-
point Likert type scale (i.e. 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neutral/Not sure, 4. Agree, 
5. Strongly agree). The panelists were required to state their degree of agreement of each item 
responses and the scores provided were then analyzed using the relative importance index 
(RII) technique in order to determine the ranking of the item responses (Mohd Fairullazi, 
2014). The RII technique was used to identify which item responses that are important and 
significant to be included in the answer set of the question (Mohd Fairullazi, 2014). Higher 
RII score means higher ranking for the item. A ‘cut-off’ relative index of 0.60 on the 5-point 
Likert scale was applied (Muhwezi et al., 2014) and items that score RII 0.80 and above are 
categorized as ‘Very significant’ (Hamimah & Morledge, 2003; Mohd Fairullazi, 2014), 
while items that score between 0.79 and 0.60 are categorized as ‘Significant’. Table 3 and 
Figure 1 present the indication and formula used to interpret the SD score and RII formula 
respectively. 
 
Table 3. Standard deviation and level of consensus 
Standard Deviation (SD) Level of consensus achieved 
0 ≤ X ˂ 1 High level of consensus 
1 ≤ X ˂ 1.5 Reasonable/ fair level of consensus 
1.5 ≤ X ˂ 2 Low level of consensus 
2 ≤ X No consensus 
        (Mohd Fairullazi, 2014 and Nur Syaimasyaza, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 1. RII formula (Nur Syaimasyaza, 2017) 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Out of nine (9) implications presented to the panelists, only one implication (Code: 450) 
achieved mode score ‘2’ for both rounds, which indicates that most panelists ‘Disagree’ with 
the implication (Table 4). Meanwhile, the remaining implications achieved mode score ‘4’ 
which means that most panelists ‘Agree’ with the implications identified for each clause and 
RI = n1(1) + n2(2) + n3(3) + n4(4) + n5(5) 
5N 
Where: 
n1 = Number of respondents for “Strongly disagree”  
n2 = Number of respondents for “Disagree”   
n3 = Number of respondents for “Neutral/Not sure”          
n4 = Number of respondents for “Agree” 
n5 = Number of respondents for “Strongly agree” 
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the level of consensus indicate ‘high level of consensus’ achieved as the SD scores are below 
1.00. 
 
Table 4. Mode and SD score for Round 1 and Round 2 MD (Nur Syaimasyaza, 2017) 
1Code Implications 1
st round 2nd round 
Mode SD Mode SD 
 
370 
Clause B - Concession Charges 









380 The failure to forecast future demand with confidence could 
affect the concession company’s profit flow. 
4 0.84 4 0.76 
 
390 
Clause E - Asset Management Services 
The difficulties in specifying soft service delivery due to the 
problem of subjectivity cause dispute over the interpretation of:  









400 b) standard 4 0.65 4 0.00 
 
410 
Clause F - Service Levels 









420 Risk of opportunistic behaviour 4 0.00 4 0.00 
 
430 
Clause G - Additional Works 









440 Changes to the contract represented a fertile area for 
opportunistic behavior  
4 0.97 4 0.98 
 
450 
Clause J - Project Monitoring Committee 
Lack of efficient monitoring system is one of the reasons for the 










Additional implications suggested by the panelist in Round 1 MD were consolidated into 
50 implications and they were presented to the panelists in Round 2 to be rated. Scores 
obtained from the panelists in Round 2 MD were transformed into important indices factors 
using RII formula (Figure 1). Table 5 below presents the RII score for each implication. From 
the list, implication 460, 510, 520, 590, 600, 640, 650, 660, 700, 710, and 870 are considered 
‘Very significant’ with RII scores 0.80 and above. Implication 550 and 890 did not achieve 
the ‘cut-off’ relative index of 0.60 and they were excluded from the final result. Other 
implications achieved RII score 0.60 to 0.79 and they are considered ‘Significant’. 
 
Table 5. RII score for additional implications obtained from Round 1 MD (Nur Syaimasyaza, 2017) 
Code1 Suggested implications RII Rank Significant 




Delay in concluding the document to be submitted and consequently 







470 Failure to prepare the document (originally not specified in the 
contract), when the need arises 
0.74 4 Significant 
480 Exploitation of the contract clause (incomplete contract) by involved 
parties 
0.75 3 Significant 
490 The dispute in interpreting the ambiguous clause (determining the 
required document) 




Provides flexibility to deal with future uncertainty, e.g. the party can 











Allow for any improvement to be made when there are changes to 







520 Allow the parties to deal with uncertainty and benefit from the 
renegotiation 
0.80 2 Very 
significant 
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Code1 Suggested implications RII Rank Significant 




The additional cost to the concession company, because they usually 







540 Delay and dispute in the project due to changes in design 0.71 1 Significant 
550 The additional cost to the government due to changes in design (the 
government need to bear the cost to make changes) 




Minimal interruption of the construction works from the government (in 
the case where the clause did not specify the possibility for the 







570 Allow the government to request for changes without any cost 
implication (since the clause is silent on the Government's rights to 
issue change, the Government can persuade the Concession company 
to make the change without cost increment) 
0.62 3 Significant 
580 Provide flexibility to implement a new and better 
technology/specification 
0.78 1 Significant 
 Clause D - Delay of the Construction Works    
 -No suggestion has been made-    




Time-consuming for the approval process of variation due to several 




















620 Allow both parties to deal with uncertainty and future changes 0.78 1 Significant 




Unable to apply the true Asset Facility Management (the clause only 

















650 Provide flexibility to cater future change 0.83 1 Very 
significant 
660 Provide an opportunity for the parties to renegotiate, to deal with future 
uncertainty. 
0.82 3 Very 
significant 






















690 Fair to both sides to deal with uncertainty and future changes 0.78 3 Significant 
700 Provide an opportunity for both parties to achieve a win-win solution 0.80 2 Very 
significant 
710 Allow the government to request additional works in the future 0.82 1 Very 
significant 
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Code1 Suggested implications RII Rank Significant 
740 Leeway for the concession company to escape from their responsibility 
(The clause 'Change in Shareholding' could cause the Concession 
company to have the mindset that they can withdraw from the contract 








750 Negatively affect the government due to the uncertain performance of 
the new shareholders 
0.68 8 Significant 
760 Tedious work to prepare the paperwork for the change in shareholding 0.66 9 Significant 
770 Revise terms and conditions in the agreement might put the concession 
company on the disadvantage side 
0.71 6 Significant 
780 Cost and time implication due to negotiation process 0.77 1 Significant 
790 Risk of opportunistic behavior, e.g. the party refuses to agree on the 
calculation of the Refinancing Gain. 
0.77 1 Significant 
800 The dispute in determining the basis and method of calculation for 
Financing Gain 
0.74 3 Significant 
810 Delay in determining the method and calculation of the Refinancing 
Gain 











830 Allow the government to revise any terms and conditions in the 
agreement to benefit the government in the event there are changes in 
shareholders. 
0.66 4 Significant 
840 Allow both parties to deal with uncertainty and future changes 0.77 1 Significant 
850 Allow the parties to refer to the latest method and calculation of 
Refinancing Gain 
0.72 2 Significant 














Allow both parties to deal with uncertainty and future changes 
0.82 1 Very 
significant 




Disputes due to lack of guidelines on what the Project Monitoring 







890 Delay in project performance 0.58 3  
900 Unfair practice or unfair decision making due to lack of guidelines 0.63 2 Significant 




Lead to delay in resolving the disputes, e.g. lack of guidelines on what 







920 Lead to disputes 0.74 1 Significant 











940 Sub-standard compliance with the safety and health requirement 
(safety and health element is not taken into consideration in their cost 
estimation during tendering) 
0.66 1 Significant 
950 Unable to refer to any related clause, in the event, there is an 
accident/incident 
0.65 2 Significant 
1 All items and responses obtained from both rounds’ MD were coded in an increasing number of 10 (i.e. 10, 20, 30, 
etc.). Coding presented in this paper is as in the author’s PhD dissertation [8]. 
 
The results from both rounds MD had identified and assessed 56 implications of the 
incomplete clause. Interestingly, the incomplete clause could have both positive and negative 
implication as shown above for Clause Condition Precedent, Clause Concession Charges, 
Clause Design and Construction of the Project, Clause Asset Management Services, and 
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others. Among the positive implications identified, most of them are regarding the flexibility 
of the incomplete clause to deal with future change and opportunity to renegotiate. This is 
similar with the findings by Athias & Saussier (2010) where IC is preferred because of its 
flexibility to deal with the uncertainty of traffic flow. 
 
On the other hand, most negative implications are concerning delay, disputes, and risk of 
opportunistic behavior. The finding is consistent with previous scholars i.e. Ho & Tsui (2009), 
Robinson & Scott (2009) and Domingues & Sarmento (2016). Based on the findings above, 
it has been confirmed that the presence of IC in PFI projects in Malaysia could have both 




This study has successfully identified and assessed 56 implications of IC in PFI projects 
in Malaysia with specific reference to each incomplete clause. Most of the positive 
implications are concerning flexibility to deal with future change and opportunity to 
renegotiate. While, negative implications are mostly regarding the delay, disputes, and risk of 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
Although IC cause positive implication, the fact that negative implication could also occur, 
PFI stakeholders cannot take the matter lightly and they should be ready with strategies to 
minimize or eliminate the negative implication. Besides, strategies to improve or maintain the 










Athias, L., & Saussier, S. (2010). Contractual Flexibility or Rigidity for Public Private 
Partnerships ? Theory and Evidence from Infrastructure Concession Contracts (No. 
EPPP DP No. 2010-3). Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=828944 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.828944 
Bajari, P., Tadelis, S., & Houghton, S. (2014). Bidding for Incomplete Contracts : An 
Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs. The American Economic Review, 104(4), 1288–
1319. Retrieved from 
http://faculty.washington.edu/bajari/iosp10/bidding_incomplete_3-2010.pdf 
Boukendour, S. (2007). Preventing post contractual opportunism by an option to switch from 
one contract to another. Construction Management and Economics, 25(7), 723–727. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/01446190701392994 
Craswell, R. (1999). Contract Law : General Theories. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
3, 1–24. Retrieved from encyclo.findlaw.com/4000book.pdf 
Domingues, S., & Sarmento, J. M. (2016). Critical renegotiation triggers of European 
transport concessions. Transport Policy, 48(April), 82–91. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2016.02.016 
Implication of Incomplete Contract (IC) in Malaysian Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) Projects
73
Ellman, M. (2006). Does Privatising Public Service Provision Reduce Accountability? 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper, 997. 
Froud, J. (2003). The Private Finance Initiative : risk , uncertainty and the state. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 28, 567–589. 
Garvin, M. J. (2009). Governance of PPP Projects Through Contract Provisions. In 
Conference of Leadership and Management of Construction. Retrieved from 
http://www.academiceventplanner.com/LEAD2009/papers/Garvin.pdf 
Grant, S., Kline, J. J., & Quiggin, J. (2012). Differential awareness, ambiguity, and 
incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 82(2-3), 494–504. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.02.021 
Guasch, J. L. (2004). Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions- Doing It Right. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved from http://ppp.worldbank.org/ 
Habets, J. (2010). Incomplete Contracts and Public-Private Partnership; A case study of the 
Dutch Infrastructure policy. Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved from 
http://oaithesis.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/7830/Habets, J. 325079 - id thesis 7830.pdf. 
Hamimah, A., & Morledge, R. (2003). Application of Delphi Method on Critical Success 
Factors In Joint Venture Projects In Malaysian Construction Industry. In C. O. Egbu & 
M. K. L. Tong (Eds.), Proceedings of The First Scottish Conference for Postgraduate 
Researchers of The Built And Natural Environment 18-19 November 2003 - Glasgow 
Caledonian University, Glasgow, United Kingdom (pp. 41–51). Scotland, United 
Kingdom: Glasgow Caledonian University. 
Hart, O. (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. United States: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ho, S. P., & Tsui, C. W. (2009). The Transaction Costs of Public-Private Partnerships: 
Implications on PPP Governance Design. In Lead 2009 Specialty Conference: Global 
Governmance in Project Organiations, South Lake Tahoe, CA (pp. 5–7). Retrieved from 
http://www.academiceventplanner.com/LEAD2009/papers/Ho_Tsui.pdf 
Iossa, E., Spagnolo, G., & Vellez, M. (2007). Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships. 
Retrieved from http://ppp.worldbank.org/ 
Kostritsky, J. P. (2004). Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World : 
What to do when Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete 
Contracts (No. 4). Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=596609 
Miller, F., Denison, C. a., & Matuszewski, L. J. (2013). Modeling the Antecedents of 
Preferences for Incomplete Contracts in Bilateral Trade: An Experimental Investigation. 
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 25(1), 135–159. http://doi.org/10.2308/bria-50346 
Mohd Fairullazi, A. (2014). Development of Life Cycle Cost Strategy and Protocol on Cost 
Data Input in Malaysia. International Islamic University Malaysia. 
Mohd Fairullazi, A., & Khairuddin, A. R. (2016). Review of Methodology Designed to 
Investigate Quality of Cost Data Input in Life Cylce Cost. Malaysian Construction 
Research Journal (MCRJ), 19(2). 
Muhwezi, L., Acai, J., & Otim, G. (2014). An Assessment of the Factors Causing Delays on 
Building Construction Projects in Uganda. Construction Engineering and Management, 
3(1), 13–23. http://doi.org/10.5923/j.ijcem.20140301.02 
Nur Syaimasyaza, M. (2017). Incomplete Contract in Private Finance Initiative (PFI): 
Identification of Its Presence and Development of Proposed Strategies. International 
Islamic University Malaysia. 
 
 
Nur Syaimasyaza Mansor et al.74
Nur Syaimasyaza, M., Khairuddin, A. R., Mohd Fairullazi, A., & Sharina Farihah, H. (2017a). 
Application of Modified Delphi in Identifying the Presence of Incomplete Contract (IC) 
in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Projects. Malaysian Construction Research Journal 
(MCRJ), 22(2), 19–33. 
Nur Syaimasyaza, M., Mohd Fairullazi, A., & Khairuddin, A. R. (2017b). Incomplete 
Contract in Private Finance Initiative (PFI): A Modified Delphi Study. Advanced Science 
Letters, 23, 227–231. 
Onishi, M., Omoto, T., & Kobayashi, K. (2002). Risk-Sharing Rule in Project Contracts. 
IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/ICSMC.2002.1175588 
Peter, E. D., Love, P. R., Davis, J. M., & Cheung, S. O. (2010). A systemic view of dispute 
causation. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 3(4), 661–680. 
http://doi.org/10.1108/17538371011076109 
PPIAF. (2009). Amendments to contracts and dispute resolution: Renegotiation and 
Amendments to PPP Contracts. Retrieved from 
https://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/pdf-
version/5-71.pdf 
Robinson, H. S., & Scott, J. (2009). Service delivery and performance monitoring in PFI/PPP 
projects. Construction Management and Economics, 27(2), 181–197. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802614163 
Triantis, G. G. (1999). Unforeseen Contingencies, Risk Allocation in Contracts. Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics, 100–116. 
Yates, D. J. (1998). Conflict and Disputes in the Development Process: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, 1–14. Retrieved from 
http://www.prres.net/proceedings/proceedings1998/Papers/Yates3Ai.PDF 
Ya-zhuo, L., & Fan, L. (2011). An Analysis of Contractual Incompleteness in Construction 
Exchanges. In Computer Sciences and Convergence Information Technology (ICCIT), 
2011 6th International Conference (pp. 963–967). IEEE. 




e 29 | N
o.3 | 2019
Volume 29 | No.3 | 2019 Volume 29 | No.3 | 2019
